MIL-STD-1316E
not be erasable or alterable by credible environments which the fuze would otherwise survive.
4.3 Safety system failure rate. The fuze safety system failure rate shall be calculated for all logistic and tactical phases from fuze manufacture to safe separation or to the point at which friendly forces and equipment no longer need protection. The safety system failure rate shall be verified to the extent practical by test and analysis during fuze evaluation and shall not exceed the rates given for the following phases:
a. Prior to intentional initiation of the arming sequence: one failure to prevent arming or functioning (irrespective of arming) in one million fuzes.
b. Prior to the exit (for tubed launched munitions): one failure to prevent arming in ten thousand fuzes, and one failure to prevent functioning in one million fuzes.
c. Between initiation of the arming sequence or tube exit, if tube launched, and safe separation: one failure to prevent arming in one thousand fuzes. The rate of fuze functioning during this period shall be as low as practical and consistent with the risk established as acceptable for premature munition functioning.
4.3.1 Analyses. The following analyses shall be performed to identify hazardous conditions for the purpose of their elimination or control.
a. A preliminary hazard analysis shall be conducted to identify and classify hazards of normal and abnormal environments, as well as conditions and personnel actions that may occur in the phases before safe separation. This analysis shall be used in the preparation of system design, test and evaluation requirements. (see 6.5)
b. System hazard analyses and detailed analysis, such as fault tree analyses, and failure mode, effects, and criticality analyses, shall be conducted to arrive at an estimate of the safety system failure rate and to identify any single-point or credible failure modes.
c. For fuzing systems containing an embedded microprocessor, controller or other computing device, the analyses shall include a determination of the contribution of the software (see 4.2.4) to the enabling of a safety feature.
d. Where the software is shown to directly control or remove one or more safety features, a detailed analysis and testing of the applicable software shall be performed to assure that no design weaknesses, credible software failures, or credible hardware failures propagating through the software can result incompromise of the safety features.
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