MIL-STD-1911A
4. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS
4.1 General. The following general requirements apply to the design of Hand-Emplaced
Ordnance (HEO) within the scope of this document.
4.1.1 Life cycle definition. In concert with the conceptual design of the HEO, a life cycle environmental profile shall be defined. The profile shall establish the environmental conditions and limits the HEO will encounter performing the threat hazard assessment.
4.1.2 HEO safety failure rate. The HEO safety failure rate shall be predicted for all phases of the HEO's life cycle. The safety failure rate shall be less than one in one million until international initiation of arming. The safety failure rate predicted by analysis shall be verified to the extent practical by test during evaluation. They failure rate for a specific HEO design to prevent unintentional functioning during and after arming shall be acceptable to the cognizant safety authority (see 6.5).
4.1.2.1 Analyses. The following analyses shall be conducted to identify hazardous conditions associated with the HEO. The analyses shall be done early enough in the development process to enable elimination or control of the identified hazards by the design of the HEO.
a. A preliminary hazard analysis to identify hazards of normal and abnormal environments, with special emphasis on conditions and personnel actions that may occur throughout the HEO life cycle. This analysis shall be used in the definition of the HEO design, test and evaluation requirements. (see 6.5)
b. System and major component hazard analyses to estimate the HEO safety failure rate and to identify any single point or credible failure modes. Techniques such as fault tree analysis and failure modes, effects and criticality analysis may be used in carrying out hazards analyses.
c. When the HEO contains a computing subsystem, an appropriate analysis shall be conducted to identify all safety-critical functions that are controlled by the computing subsystem. Computing subsystems that control safety-critical functions shall be analyzed in detail and tested for the purpose of verifying that no design weakness, software failure, or credible hardware failure propagating through the computing subsystem will compromise safety.
4.1.3 Safety redundancy. The safety system of HEO shall contain at least two independent safety features, each of which shall prevent unintentional arming. Enabling of each safety feature shall require a different action. Those actions must be performed in a specific sequence for arming to be permitted.
4.1.4 Arming or firing-control delay. HEOs shall incorporate a method for obtaining safe separation. An arming delay provides the highest level of safety and shall be used wherever feasible. If operational or functional requirements dictate and with prior approval of the cognizant safety authority, a fail safe firing-control delay may be used to obtain safe separation.
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